In class we've been discussing classical skeptical arguments. In doing so, we're adopting an evidentialist framework. Maybe that's a mistake. Perhaps invoking a non-evidentialist framework is the way to go here.
I'd like you to read Richard Feldman and Earl Conee's essay "Making Sense of Skepticism". It can be found here:
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/private/content/philosophy/9780199253722/p061.html#acprof-9780199253722-chapter-13
In the essay they consider how paradigmatic non-evidentialist views purport to handle these classical skeptical arguments. They argue that they all fail to make sense of the force of the skeptical arguments. Furthermore, they argue that evidentialism provides the resources to refute those skeptical arguments.
In your comment(s), I'd like you to evaluate Feldman and Conee's arguments. Are they right that non-evidentialist views fail to make sense of the skeptical arguments? Are they right that evidentialism adequately handles the skeptical arguments?
Be sure to interact with each other. Here's one opportunity to have good discussion with others on such matters.
I think that Feldman and Conee do a good job of showing that skepticism is a problem for all theories of knowledge and not just for evidentialist theories of knowledge. I was surprised that the skeptical arguments for evidentialism could work so well for many non-evidentialist theories. An example being the possibility of error argument, no matter what system of knowledge there is always the possibility of error. From what was said in class on Thursday I thought that evidentialism and non-evidentialism would be very different in dealing with skepticism. I guess this shows that Skepticism is a real threat for any theory of knowledge.
ReplyDelete-Cdgoodremote
I think I agree with them that non-evidential arguments against skepticism can't be based on the fact that they have no evidence and thus the skepticism doesn't work on them. Using that line of reasoning doesn't seem to solve the skeptical issues, it just seems like they try (and fail) to sidestep the problem. Evidentialist arguments seem to fare a little better because they argue more for knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt and not for knowledge beyond all possibility of a doubt. There is still some footholds for skepticism in evidentialism but they are confronting the issue in a more direct manner then the non-evidentialists. A large hole in the evidentialists rebuttal of skepticism seems mostly to do with how much evidence a person would need to know a fact beyond a reasonable doubt. I suppose a skeptic could be said to be someone who never has enough evidence to say they can know a fact beyond a reasonable doubt. I also agree with Chad, the possibility of error seems to be a problem for every and any theory of knowledge and not just evidentialism.
ReplyDeleteEvidentialist arguments, unlike the non-evidentialist arguments confront the skepticist concerns. I don't truly believe they "handle" them, but there is at least clash happening between the two theories, when if you look at non-e, it just appears to be unconcerned with the arguments. This paragraph is perfect:
ReplyDelete"These are the fundamental epistemological questions that are raised by the classic skeptical arguments. The traditional skeptical arguments are formulated as arguments about knowledge largely because it is assumed that knowledge requires good reasons. We see no good reason to deny that assumption. If it is jettisoned, the questions do not go away. Instead, they must be formulated more directly as questions about reasons or justification, not as questions about knowledge."
Chad and Rebecca both bring up a good point: PE is going to be problematic for any theory of knowledge...possibility of error is infinitely regressive. (Plus, Rebecca knows: she's a scientist. She knows about error and truth stuff). But all of them SHOULD be problematic. PE is just the most clear. HEY: WHAT DO YOU GUYS THINK IS THE ARGUMENT NON-EVIDENTIALIST THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE HANDLE THE BEST? I THINK TRANSMISSIBILITY.
ps: nature abhors a vacuum.