Making Sense of Skepticism

In class we've been discussing classical skeptical arguments. In doing so, we're adopting an evidentialist framework. Maybe that's a mistake. Perhaps invoking a non-evidentialist framework is the way to go here.

I'd like you to read Richard Feldman and Earl Conee's essay "Making Sense of Skepticism". It can be found here:

http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/private/content/philosophy/9780199253722/p061.html#acprof-9780199253722-chapter-13

In the essay they consider how paradigmatic non-evidentialist views purport to handle these classical skeptical arguments. They argue that they all fail to make sense of the force of the skeptical arguments. Furthermore, they argue that evidentialism provides the resources to refute those skeptical arguments.

In your comment(s), I'd like you to evaluate Feldman and Conee's arguments. Are they right that non-evidentialist views fail to make sense of the skeptical arguments? Are they right that evidentialism adequately handles the skeptical arguments?

Be sure to interact with each other. Here's one opportunity to have good discussion with others on such matters.

Goldman's Reliabilism

So today we discussed Goldman's reliabilism about justification. We considered some objections to his account. Any reactions to those objections? Do you think that reliabilism is in trouble as a result? Or are there good replies on behalf of reliabilism?

Gilbert Harman's Examples

Consider Gilbert Harman's examples from his Thought. Does the subject know in each of the cases? Consider, further, the Sally's Textbook Example. Does Sally know in that case? Do any of these cases pose problems for the No Defeaters Theory? How about Feldman's Modest Proposal?

Acquaintance Knowledge and Propositional Knowledge

Feldman claims both that there are different kinds of knowledge, and that not all kinds of knowledge are reducible to propositional knowledge. He argues that both acquaintance knowledge and ability knowledge are irreducible to propositional knowledge.

Let's focus upon acquaintance knowledge here. Feldman says this: "No matter how many facts you know about a person, it does not follow that you know that person. Knowing a person or thing is being acquainted with that person or thing, not having propositional knowledge about the person or thing." (11)

Is Feldman right about this? Suppose Smith has never met Jones, but Smith is stalking Jones. Smith is not just any stalker. Rather, Smith is what we might call "an Ultimate Stalker". This means that, for any proposition p about Jones, Smith knows that p. So, Smith knows all of Jones' dispositions, attitudes, desires, attributes, thoughts, history, etc. In short, if it's true of Jones, Smith knows it. Now further suppose that you ask Smith, "Hey, do you know Jones?" Smith replies, "Well, I've never met Jones, but yeah, I know him." That doesn't sound too strange. But if Feldman's right, it should. Indeed, it should sound contradictory. But it doesn't. That's bad for Feldman.

Feldman also offers us this: "Knowing x isn't a matter of knowing facts about x. Instead, it is a matter of being acquainted with x--having met x and perhaps remembering that meeting." (11)

This suggests the following: S knows x =df. S met x and remembers that meeting.

But is that right? Here's an objection to that account. Suppose Feldman is at a book-signing at Barnes and Noble. He's signing copies of his Epistemology. Wilson goes, shakes Feldman's hand, exchanges names, gets his book signed, and leaves. Years later, you ask Wilson, "Hey, do you know Feldman?" Wilson replies, "Well, I met Feldman, and I remember that meeting well, but no, I don't know him." That doesn't sound too strange. But if Feldman's right, it should. Indeed, it should sound contradictory. But it doesn't. That's bad for Feldman.

What do you make of all this? Be sure to interact with each other!